2. Science, Technology, and
Intelligence by Hunt, Earl
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
The Influence of Cognitive Psychology on 
Testing 
Buros-Nebraska Series on Measurement and 
Testing 
1987 
2. Science, Technology, and Intelligence 
Earl Hunt 
The University of Washington 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/buroscogpsych 
 Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons, and the Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and 
Research Commons 
Hunt, Earl, "2. Science, Technology, and Intelligence" (1987). The Influence of Cognitive Psychology on 
Testing. 5. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/buroscogpsych/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Buros-Nebraska Series on Measurement and Testing at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Influence of Cognitive 
Psychology on Testing by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Earl Hunt 
Science, Technology, and 
Intelligence' 
The University of Washington 
The intelligence test has been cited as psychology's most important technological 
contribution to society. Whether this is good or ill can be debated (Eysenck, 
1979; Gould, 1981; Herrnstein, 1971; Kamin, 1974). Certain facts are not really 
subject to debate . Psychologists can and have developed "standardized inter-
views" that, on a population basis, provide a cost effective technique for person-
nel classification in industrial, military, and some government settings. Howev-
er, the tests are very far from perfect indicators. Validity coefficients between 
tests and performance ratings typically range in the .3 to .5 range (i.e. , from 10 
to 25% of the variance in performance is predictable from test scores). While 
such correlations may be high enough to justify testing in many situations, there 
is a nagging feeling that better tests can be found . 
The popular view is that a technology must be rooted in a science; in this case 
psychological tests must be rooted in a science of mental competence. In fact, the 
situation is not quite that simple. Psychology has two distinct sciences of mental 
power. One, the psychometric study of intelligence (hencefOith psychometrics), 
(2) is closely interwined with the development of testing itself. The other tradi-
tion , Cognitive Psychology, has historically stood apart from the study of indi-
vidual differences. Yet, both study the human mind, in the human brain. 
A number of years ago Cronbach (1957) urged psychologists to unite these 
two disciplines. At one level the uniting took place. Cognitive psychologists do 
IThe term " psychometrics" will be used throughout this paper to refer to the psychological 
theories of mental competence that have been developed by applying correlational analysis methods 
to test scores . The alternative meaning of psychometrics , as a branch of applied mathematics, will not 
be used. 
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look at individual vari ations, and the techniques of Cognitive Psychology are 
used to study individual di fferences. The resulting research, however, has had 
rather little influence on the technology of testing . Is this because there is always 
too long a lag between science and technology? Or is there a deeper reason? And 
if there is a deeper reason , is there cause for al arm? Should something be done to 
accelerate the application of new scientific findings to psychologica l technology? 
These questions are particularly apt today because Cognitive Psychology and 
a group of related disciplines, collectively called the "Cognitive Sciences," are 
perceived as being extremely active intellectually. This is in marked contrast to 
psychometrics, where the questions currentl y being debated are not terribl y 
different from those that were debated over 50 years ago (Hunt , 1986a). Interest 
in the technological potential of the Cognitive Sciences has been expressed at as 
high a level as the Offi ce of the Pres ident of the United States (Holden, 1984) . 
The interest in Cognitive Science has a strong technological bias. It is hoped that 
advances in the study o f laws of cognition will lead to the development of a 
technology of intelligent devices. These devices may expand the power of human 
intelligence . They may also expand the effi ciency of our society 's very large 
program of formal education , which is perceived as having substantial defects. It 
is log ical to believe that the development of better methods to improve mental 
competence will be closely linked to better methods of evaluating competence. 
This view may be too optimistic. The current fervor in the Cognitive Sciences 
is based on real changes in our views of the mind . However, these changes are 
derived from theories about cognition that are almost intellectuall y orthogonal to 
psychometric theories of intelligence on which modern intelligence testing is 
founded. Previous writers have urged that psychometricians and experimental 
psychologists unite in their study of the mind (Cronbach, 1957; R . J. Sternberg, 
1977a, b; Underwood , 1975). They have proposed that the personal ability mea-
surements of the psychometricians be added to the des ign vari ables manipulated 
by the experimentali sts, so that the interactions between the two could be stud-
ied . This logic is epitomized by the phrase "aptitude x treatment interaction. " 
The same logic is found , slightly muted , in studies of cognitive correlates be-
tween psychometric and Cogniti ve Science measures (Pellegrino & Glaser, 
1979) . In both cases there is an implicit assumption that di scovering the correla-
tions between measures that have been developed in different inte llectual tradi-
tions will fu rther our understanding in both fi elds. In thi s paper some questions 
are raised about the approach. Two traditions can seldom be rammed together by 
statistics. What is required is a theoretical synthes is that fu ses them. If the 
synthes is cannot be made the theories will probably co-exist , each covering 
slightly different domains. 
Is the synthes is on the separate theory approach appropriate for the study of 
individual di fferences in cognition? This question can be only answered by 
considering the present status of the psychometric and Cognitive Science views 
of the mind , and asking whether they are compatible. This question is explored 
below. The sort of answer to be expected should be made clear. It is not a 
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question of one approach being right and one being wrong . Neither is it a 
question of technology versus science. The question is whether psychometrics 
and cognitive science can be synthesized into a single view. If they can, then the 
technology can be developed from a uniform scientific basis. If Cronbach's two 
"camps of scientific psychology" are inevitably separate camps each may devel-
op its own technology, which may be useful for different purposes. 
THE PRESENT STATUS OF PSYCHOMETRIC THEORY 
Since its inception psychometrics has been beholden to technology. Where 
would test theory be without the number 2 lead pencil, the mark sense form, and 
the calculating machine? The digital computer, which came somewhat later, 
really did little more than cement intellectual trends that had already developed in 
response to what, collectively, will be called the' 'paper and pencil technology." 
The paper and pencil technology made it easy to record the products of 
cognition. Note the stress on product. The paper and pencil technology is at its 
best when large numbers of fairly short questions are presented and when the 
respondent must choose from a fixed set of alternatives. The paper and pencil 
technology is not well suited to recording how a person chooses the answers, and 
is worse suited for situations in which free form responding is required. Perhaps 
most important, the paper and pencil technology emphasizes counting the total 
number of correct items or, in more recent applications, determining the most 
difficult item that a person can consistently answer correctly. Thus, the condi-
tions of the measurement procedure rule out observation of some psychologically 
interesting behavior, and no amount of theorizing can put them back in. 
The paper and pencil testing process has also been influenced by the economic 
constraints imposed on personnel evaluation, largely in military and educational 
settings. Because the test has been thought of as a one-time only measure on 
which to base a long term prediction of a vaguely specified criterion, great stress 
has been laid on measuring traits that are stable over repeated test administra-
tions . Indeed, in many discussions of testing the correlations between test scores 
taken at different times are regarded as measures of test reliability rather than as 
measures of the stability of the examinee's ability to do whatever the test 
requires. 
These are reasonable strategies if the goal of prediction is accepted. The 
decision to concentrate on stable mental traits does , however, rule out of consid-
eration broad classes of behavior that could be considered part of intelligence. In 
particular, measures of learning and of individual variability of performance will 
not be measured . However, learning and personal stability could easily be re-
garded as part of a person's mental competence. 
While any testing technology will be appropriate for some behavior and not 
for others , the very success of paper and pencil testing has made its shortcomings 
unusually serious. The behaviors measured on the tests have become the accept-
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ed definition of intelligence. The extent of this belief has been shown by reac-
tions to some of the attempts that experimental psychologists have made to 
establish theories of individual differences in cognition. Although these attempts 
proceed from a very different tradition, and although atempts to reproduce cor-
relations with traditional tests were specifically disavowed in one of the earliest 
papers on these attempts (Hunt, Frost, & Lunneborg, 1973) people still evaluate 
both their own (Keating, 1984) and other's (R. J . Sternberg, 1984, but for a more 
balanced view see R. J . Sternberg, 1985) work in terms of correlations with 
existing tests. 
The paper and pencil technology has led to a particular type of theorizing. The 
volume of data produced by giving batteries of tests to large numbers of people 
has forced psychometricians to develop sophisticated statistical procedures for 
data summarization and analysis. The natural way to represent a person' s test 
scores is by a vector, and the natural way to summarize a vector is by a smaller 
vector. Hence factor analysis, the art of extracting the small factor score vector 
from the bewilderingly large vectors of test scores. The summary is well defined 
mathematically . A person's abilities are represented by a point in a Euclidean 
space of " mental abilities." The point is then mapped on a line representing the 
(usually vaguely defined) ultimate criteria. As shown in Fig. 2.1, this is a 
perfectly respectable way of making classification decisions . 
The Euclidean representation has been used as a psychological theory of 
intelligence, by interpreting the dimensions of the Euclidean space as basic 
mental traits. The method is well known , so no further description is needed 
here. (See Nunnaly, 1978, for a good introduction .) This is where the problem 
lies. Factor analytic based theories do not provide an adequate conceptual basis 
for thinking about individual differences in mental competence, except for the 
restricted purpose of classification . Why is this? 
SPATJ AL 
ABILITY 
*- -----7 
VERBAL AB I LI n 
ACCEPT 
PRED I ClEO 
JOB 
PERFORMANCE 
REJECT 
FIG. 2.1. The Euclidean mode l of mental ab ility . A person is conceptualized as 
a point in a space of spatial and verbal menta l traits. Each point on the space can be 
mapped into an acceptance or rejection interva l on a one-d imensional criterion 
variable . 
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The usual objection to factor analytic theories is that the factor analysis as a 
mathematical procedure does not lead to a unique Euclidean representation of the 
data. Therefore subsidiary mathematical assumptions are made that, in effect, 
dictate the psychological theory to be accepted (Gould, 1981). The biggest 
argument is over whether one should insist that the dimensions, when interpreted 
as traits, be mathematically orthogonal. The argument is not trivial, because the 
orthogonality requirement mathematically precludes the discovery of separate 
but correlated psychological traits. This and similar indeterminancies in the 
mathematical solutions to the data analysis problem set the stage for a confusing 
play of empirical observations. Different investigators applied different mathe-
matical techniques to different data sets; producing a variety of claims for models 
that vary from Spearman's (1927) classic "general" theory of intelligence 
through hierarchial model of "general intelligence" of varying degrees, and 
finally to the orthogonal specific abilities models exposed by Thurstone (1938) 
and Guilford (1967) . 
The trees may have obscured the forest. Carroll (1984) has done the field a 
considerable service by applying consistent factor analytic procedures to some of 
the major data sets reported in the literature. In it's simplest form, what Carroll 
found is that most of these data sets can be fit by a " hierarchial general factor" 
model of human abilities. Examples of such models are those espoused by Cattell 
and Horn (Cattell, 1971; Horn & Donaldson, 1980) or by Vernon (1961). The 
Cattell-Horn model seems to be the most accurate. It assumes that there are three 
major classes of abilities. These are the "crystallized," and usually highly 
verbal, ability to apply previously learned solutions to current problems (Gc), the 
"fluid intelligence" ability to apply general problem solving methods to new 
situations (Gf), and a "visualization" ability to deal with problems involving 
visual-spatial relations (Gv). (There is some evidence for an analagous ability to 
deal with auditory relations [Stankov & Horn , 1980]) . There is ample evidence 
that these abilities are distinct, although Gc and Gf are correlated in most 
populations. 
One of the most encouraging things about the Cattell-Horn model is that it fits 
reasonably well with neuropsychological analyses of brain function. These anal-
yses are based on quite different sorts of observations about cognition; extensive 
examinations of pathological cases . The match is particularly strong for Gv and 
for Gc, interpreted as verbal ability, for there is massive evidence that spatial-
visual and verbal information processing take place in different physical loca-
tions in the brain (Kolb & Whishaw, 1980). There is also some evidence for 
selective forebrain involvement in the sorts of planning functions that appear to 
be involved in the ability to plan and coordinate activities . At least superficially 
this sounds like Gf, although it should be realized that the sorts of failures of 
planning described for frontal lobe patients are much more extreme than those 
associated with low Gf. 
In summary, hierarchial models provide good summaries of the abilities 
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tapped by paper and pencil testing. To a limited extent, we can make a guess 
about where some of the information processing that underlies the tr~its identi-
fied in the models takes place in the brain. Clearly there is some reality to the 
model, as a Euclidean description of human abilities . The problem is that it is 
difficult to go further with any Euclidean model of cognition, because such 
models provide relative descriptions of the products of thought without any 
commitment to a model of the process of thinking. 
Since this point is crucial , a hypothetical illustration will be given. Consider 
the task of predicting how a person might perform on a test paragraph com-
prehension. A psychometrician could predict the total test score, by using a 
formula something like: 
Predicted test score = a x (Examinee's Gf trait score) 
+ b x (Examinee's Gc trait score), 
where a and b are appropriately valued coefficients . But this predicts how well 
the person will perform, not how. 
To describe performance on the test one has to have a model of how a person 
merges his or her general knowledge with the information in the text, in order to 
construct a representation of the information in the paragraph , and then one has 
to have a model of how the examinee interprets questions and interrogates the 
internal representation of the text. These models deal with processes , not relative 
outcomes . 
Psychometricians are certainly aware of this problem . Their approach has 
been to examine tests that appear, by mathematical criteria, to be relatively pure 
tests of a trait. The hope is that an examination of such tests will lead to a better 
understanding of what the trait means. This has worked relatively well for 
spatial-visual reasoning (Gv), which seems to be composed of several definable 
actions; holding bits of visual images in one's head, and moving images about 
"in the mind's eye" (Lohman, 1979; McGee, 1979) . The approach has worked 
much less well in the case of the more general "crystallized" and "fluid " 
intelligence traits. The relevant findings are very well summarized by recent 
work by Snow and his colleagues (Marshalak, Snow, & Lohman, 1984; Snow, 
1986). They used multidimensional scaling methods to construct a space of 
various tests in which distances between tests approximated correlations between 
them. Hence tests that define a factor will be grouped in tight clusters . A graphic 
summary of some of their results is shown in Fig. 2.2. As the figure shows, there 
are clusters that define the Gf and Gc factors. However the tests in these clusters 
tend to be complex ones. Therefore people differ in their interpretation of the 
behavioral capabilities needed to attack them. The well known Raven Pro-
gressive Matrix test (Raven, 1965), which is widely regarded as a good Gf 
measure, is a good example. The test contains problems that yield to several 
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FIG. 2.2. An abstraction of the two dimensional space of mental tests developed 
by Marshalek, Snow, and Lohman (1 983) . Tests were located by a multidimen-
sional scaling in which the distance between tests in the space is roughly propor-
tional to the correlation between them; the higher the corre lation the less the 
distance between test points. Some of the tests shown in thi s figure are I-Raven 
Matrices, 2-Letter Series, 3-Hidden Figures, 4-Paper Form Board , S-Object As-
sembly , 6-Yocabulary , 7-lnformation, 8-Comprehension of verbal statements, 9-
Arithmetic problem solving, IO-Digit span, and I I-Locating A 's in a line of tex t. 
Three groups of tests are shown , corresponding to fluid inte lligence (GF), 
crystalli zed intelligence (GC), and visualization (GY). 
alternative strategies, each of which utilizes distinct elementary processing steps 
(Hunt , 1974' . Therefore one cannot eas ily summarize the processes that the 
Raven Matrix test tests. A summary that one person finds adequate will displease 
another , and there is no way to resolve the issue . 
R. J. Sternberg (J977a, b) has developed an alternative approach to the prob-
lem of definition of what a trait means. The technique is called "component 
analysis." One assumes that an examinee's overall test performance can be 
broken down into components, where a component is defined as a process that 
begins with a defined input from previous components and ends with a defined 
output to be delivered to the next component in line . Consider analogy tests. 
Each item is of the form 
" A is to Bas C is to DI , D2, D3, D4" 
e.g., 
" Cat is to Dog as Wolf is to (Lion, Giraffe, Elephant , Penguin)" 
Such a problem can be solved in the following steps. 
I . Code the meaning of the terms. 
2. Establish the relation between the A and B terms. 
3. Apply that relation to map from the C term into an ideal answer. 
4 . Locate that answer amongst the D terms that most closely approximates the 
ideal answer. 
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The time required to answer a test item is assumed to be a linear function of the 
time required to execute each component process, plus a "junk" term represent-
ing "all other processes involved." A similar model can be constructed for 
estimating the probability of producing the correct answer as a function of the 
probability of correctly executing each component process. A person's ability to 
execute individual components can be estimated in two ways; by designing 
modified test items that isolate one of the components (as was done in Stern-
berg's original work) or by constructing a factorial experiment in which the 
experimental variables are chosen to modify the difficulty of one and only one of 
the component processes (e.g., Pellegrino & Kail, 1982). 
Componential analyses can produce very accurate partitions of variation in 
performance on different problems within a particular type of test, averaged 
across individuals . On the other hand, no one of the component process measures 
seems to account for very much of the variance in inter-individual test perfor-
mance. The "junk" parameter, which represents "encoding plus everything 
else" is consistently the most accurate estimate of general performance in other 
areas. This is disconcerting, for the processes contributing to the junk parameter 
are not defined by the experimental variations . As a result , componential analy-
sis does provide a better idea of what behaviors are required to take a conven-
tional test, but componential analysis has not related these behaviors to a theory 
of cognition, nor has it explained why some tests work as predictors in some 
situations. 
The criticisms that have been directed at the hierarchial model are not specific 
to it. They can be directed at any trait theory of cognition. This does not mean 
that trait theories are false, just that they have inherent deficiencies. Can these 
deficiencies be remedied by combining psychometrics with cognitive psychol-
ogy? To answer this question, let us take a look at the Cognitive Psychology 
view. 
THE COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY APPROACH 
Cognitive psychology is based on an approach to the mind that is markedly 
different from the Euclidean representation approach taken by psychometrics. 
The modern (post 1970) approach has been strongly influenced by a variety of 
other disciplines , notably by linguistics, neuropsychology , artificial intelligence, 
psychology, and to a lesser extent cultural anthropology. These branches of each 
of these disciplines that are concerned with thinking have come to be referred to, 
collectively, as the ' 'Cognitive Sciences." This is an umbrella term for a collec-
tive movement toward the development of a unified theory of mind rather than to 
multiple, discipline-specific models . Since modern cognitive psychology is best 
underscored as part of this movement a few words about it are in order. The basic 
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assumption of the cognitive sciences is that there are laws that govern physical 
symbol manipulating systems, somewhat akin to laws that govern physical phe-
nomena. At a very general level, Shannon & Weaver's (1 949) theory of informa-
tion transmission would be an example of such a law. The term " physical 
symbol manipulating system" is important. The cognitive science approach 
assumes cognition is achieved by the manipulation of symbols that represent 
some external world . However the act of symbol manipulation requires some sort 
of physical system. What cognitive science studies is the restraints placed on 
symbol manipulation by the nature of the external world being represented , by 
the nature of symbol manipulation itself, and by the physical character of the 
system doing the manipulation. 
Pylyshyn (1 983) has identified three levels of cognitive science studies. The 
first is the study of the influence of physical mechanisms upon cognitive process-
ing. This can be done by analyzing the one device that we know is capable of 
thought; the mammalian brain . The cognitive and neurosciences merge here. A 
complementary approach is to analyze the performance of hypothetical phys ical 
devices, to see if they could perform the computations that are required to 
achieve certain cognitive actions. Examples of such work are the study of the 
learning and memory capacities of networks of idealized, neuron-like devices 
(Hinton & Anderson , 198 1; Minsky & Papert , 1969) and analyses of the net-
works that can realize computations required in vision (Marr, 1982). 
Pylyshyns's second level of cognitive science research deals with pure sym-
bolic process ing capabilities defined without concern for the external referents of 
the symbols being processed . An example would be the well known studies of 
the scanning of information in short-term memory (S. Sternberg, 1969, 1975) or 
studies of the process of moving visual images " in the mind 's eye" (Shepard & 
Cooper, 1982). 
At the highest level are studies of thought processes that are controlled by 
people's understanding of the referents of symbolic process ing. Examples of 
work at thi s level are studies of problem solving and text comprehension. John-
son-Laird (1 983) has described this leve l of research as research on the mental 
models that people construct and manipulate in the course of problem solving. 
For brevity let us refer to these levels as the phys ical, information processing, 
and referential levels of cognition. Clearly the phys ical level is the most con-
crete, for an action of the mind must ultimately be an action of the brain . The 
referential level is what we normally think of as conscious thought. The most 
abstract of the three levels is the information process ing level. Pylyshyn present-
ed the levels as analogically similar to the study of computer circuit ry, system 
design, and programs within computer sc ience . A related , and perhaps somewhat 
clearer, analogy is to think of studies at the phys ical (brain) level in humans as 
being analogous to the study of computer hardware, studies at the representa-
tiona I level as being analagous to the study of the actions of particular programs, 
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and studies at the information process ing level as being analagous to studies of 
the operations permitted in a computer language in which the representational 
" programs" are written. 
To provide a more specific illustration, consider the study of human verbal 
comprehension. At the physical level there have been numerous studies showing 
that language process ing in the brain takes place largely in the left hemisphere 
(Kolb & Whishaw, 1980) . At the representational level we find studies of how 
the information people extract from a text is influenced by their level of knowl-
edge of the topic, the text, and their beliefs about the use they will have to make 
of the text-based information (Johnson & Kieras, 1983; Chiesi, Spillich, & Voss, 
1979) . 
The information processing level is the hardest level to define , because it 
refers to processes rather than to phys ical structures, but the processes are not 
open to conscious inspection. Continuing the analogy to computation , unraveling 
the information processing elements of cognition is a bit like attempting to infer 
the basic operations of a computer programming language by observing the 
performance of programs written in that language. The problem can be illustrated 
by considering the logic of the sentence veriftcation paradigm developed by 
Clark and Chase ( 1972) . This procedure will be considered in some detail be-
cause it has been the vehicle for a reasonable amount of research on individual 
differences. The procedure is shown in Fig. 2 .3. 
First a simple sentence is shown. The sentence is followed by a picture. The 
participant must indicate whether or not the sentence correctly describes the 
picture. Since errors are infrequent , the dependent vari ables are the time a person 
requires to comprehend the sentence ("comprehension time" ) and the time 
required to determine whether or not the sentence correctly describes the picture 
( " verification time") . These can be altered by varying the truth value and 
syntactic-semantic form of the sentence. For instance , it takes longer to verify 
negations than affirmations ( "Plus above star" versus " Plus not above star") 
and longer to veri fy sentences containing marked terms (" below") than un-
marked ones ("above" ). The time required to carry out bas ic steps in linguistic 
FIG. 2.3. The Sentencc Verifica-
tion paradigm. A phrase is displayed. 
When the participant indicatcs that 
PL US NO T ABOV E STAR the phrase is undcrstood thc picture is 
di splayed. The participant thcn deter-
* 
+ 
(RE SPON SE) 
(RESPO NSE ) 
mines whcther or not the phrase cor-
rec tl y desc ri bed the picture . The de-
pendent variables are the times 
between phrase display and com-
prehension (comprehension time) 
and picture display and ve rification 
(verification time). 
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information steps can be measured by observing how verification times change 
when sentence forms are altered systematically. The logic can be extended to 
individual difference research by determining how (or whether) the time required 
to execute a specific linguistic process varies across people . 
Harking back to my earlier di scussion of Psychometrics, two major dif-
ferences between the cognitive psychology and the psychometric approaches are 
apparent. Both are particularly striking in studies at the information processing 
and representational level. Cognitive psychology is 'interested in the process of 
cognition , rather than the product. This can be seen in the studies of verbal 
comprehension just described , where the emphas is is on building a model of how 
a linguistic statement is understood , rather than on specifying how likely a 
person is to understand an arbitrary statement. The second difference, which 
follows from the first , is that a cognitive psychology theory of individual dif-
ferences must fit into a process model of the cognitive action being studied . The 
cognitive psychologist is not particularly interested in determining the dimen-
sions of the Euclidean space adequate to describe individual's ability , relative to 
each other. The cognitive psychologist is interested in knowing how variables 
related to the individual impinge upon the process of that individual' s cognition. 
This can be illustrated by looking at a series of studies on the role of short-
term memory in reading. There is a positive correlation between measures of 
memory span and scores on omnibus written tests of verbal ability (Daneman & 
Carpenter, 1980; Palmer, MacLeod , Hunt , & Davidson, 1985). Daneman and 
her colleagues (reviewed in Daneman, 1984) asked why this is so. First it was 
shown that higher correlations can be achieved if the measure of memory span is 
one that directly refl ects the ability to hold information in memory while process-
ing intervening linguistic statements, rather than one that reflects the " pass ive" 
capacity to hold words in memory without doing some intervening activity . (The 
memory span subjects of most intelligence batteries are of the latter sort.) Next, 
it was shown that the ability to hold information in memory exerts its effect on 
certain steps in linguisti c process ing, such as the ability to resolve anaphoric 
references or to recall previously presented information when some reference to 
it is required. Instead of stopping with the observation that reading comprehen-
sion and short-term memory tests load on the same factor , Daneman and her 
colleagues examined the process of reading in order to determine what produced 
the loading. 
Because the emphasis of cognitive psychology is on process , experimenters 
try to construct laboratory situations that isolate process . A cognitive psychol-
ogist may find performance in an isolated situation extremely interesting, on 
theoretical grounds, even though that isolated situation does not draw upon 
behaviors that are called upon a great deal in the everyday world . Prediction is 
not the point. 
Measures of individual di fferences that relate to a theory of process are always 
of interest , in the framework of that theory, even though variations in the mea-
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sures may not be highly related to variations in performance in any important 
socioeconomic activity. Indeed, from a theoretical view some of the most impor-
tant measures on an individual may be those measures that reflect constancies. 
Years ago, Miller (1956) observed that there is very little absolute variation in 
the human abilities to make perceptual judgments and to hold information in 
short-term memory. The importance of these constancies for perception and 
language comprehension is immense. Yet measures with low variability are not 
good predictors. 
Given the difference in philosophy, it is not clear that cognitive psychology 
and psychometrics can be united. On the other hand, it is not clear that they 
cannot. The problems are somewhat different at each of Pylyshyn's three levels 
of the study of the mind. 
The functioning of the mind depends on the functioning of the brain, so 
questions about the relation between brain processes and mental processes are of 
interest. The famous issue of hemispheric localization of function is an example. 
So are studies of the influence of specific chemicals upon mental functioning; 
e.g., the role of alcoholic intoxication upon memory. A great deal of tech-
nological development has gone into the construction of measures of functioning 
of the physical brain, ranging from neuropsychological observations of behavior 
to such exotica as tomographic scans (Mazziotta, Phelps, Carson, & Kuhl , 
1982). The technology provides an excellent way to study two things; the general 
physical substrate of the normal mind and aberrations in mind that are produced 
by specific, usually physical alterations in the brain. 
The fact that the dimensions of individual variation uncovered by psycho-
metrics do map reasonably well upon the brain functions discovered by neuro-
psychology is an important observation. The neuropsychological observations 
are almost all based on the study of extreme cases, while the psychometric data 
rests very largely upon the study of normal variation in mental competence 
within a normal population . This suggests that there are sufficient differences in 
brain functioning in the normal population to make a difference in at least some 
of our behaviors, specifically those actions required by a conventional aptitude 
test. In terms of the Euclidean representation of the psychometrician, the ques-
tion is whether or not measures of brain functioning are sufficiently close to 
psychometric measures to fit into the psychometric dimensional representation of 
the mind. In more pragmatic terms whether or not brain function measures can be 
related to everyday functioning in normal individuals depends on whether the 
measures are related to behaviors shared by test taking and everyday cognitive 
actions , or whether the brain function measures are mainly associated with 
cognitive epiphenomena of the test itself. 
From time to time there are reports that there are "substantial correlations" 
between measurements of brain functioning and some extremely complex behav-
ior, such as a general intelligence test. (S.ee Hendrickson, 1982, for a recent 
example.) The vast majority of these reports have simply failed the crucial test of 
independent replication . This is not to deny that the proposition that individual 
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differences in brain functioning have something to do with individual cognitive 
behavior. I am sure that they do, especially in extreme cases. As a matter of 
scientific interest, studies of the relation between brain functioning and cognitive 
behavior should and will be repeated. However it is not at all clear what will be 
learned by studies that are confined to reporting correlations between gross 
measures of brain function and gross measures of mental function; e.g., a cor-
relation between a measure of the variability of the brain's overall response to a 
repeated stimulus and performance on a general intelligence test. Unless the 
correlations were extremely high (and again I repeat my caution about indepen-
dent replication) all this tells us is that the general functioning of the brain is 
related to general cognitive functioning. Did anyone doubt this? 
Brain-cognition questions have a seductive physical concreteness. If to-
mographic scans reveal metabolic activity in a particular brain region during 
certain sets of cognition (e.g., activity in the right hemisphere during spatial-
visual reasoning) then surely this must tell us how we think . Unfortunately, it 
does not. It tells us where we think. Brain function measures do not answer the 
questions posed by the cognitive psychologist unless measures on the brain can 
be associated with specific processes. To some extent this has been done, es-
pecially in the analysis of language comprehension, where the processes of word 
and sentence comprehension have been disassociated at an anatomical level. It is 
even possible that physical disassociations between different techniques for word 
analysis will be discovered (Coltheart, 1985). Such work is certainly exciting, 
but it is probably not going to have much influence on the relation between 
psychometrics and cognitive psychology, since neuropsychology rests upon evi-
dence from pathological cases. One must also remember that a process may be 
distributed over several anatomical loci. So a failure to identify an anatomical 
location for a process tells us little . There would be a need for information 
processing studies even if we knew all there was to know about neuropsychol-
ogy. 
Early theories of information processing emphasized the isolation of stages of 
symbol manipulation. In Fig. 2.4 is an example, taken from an early paper by 
Smith (1968) , in which the act of selecting a response to a stimulus was broken 
up into two stages of stimulus analysis and two stages of response execution. In 
fact, this approach is the historic progenitor of R. J . Sternberg'S (1977a,b) 
component analyses of intelligence tests . The strongest interpretation of Smith's 
model is that there are distinct stages of information processing, that activity in 
one stage is independent of activity in the other stages, and that the stages pass 
information to each other in a serial manner. Thus a model like that shown in 
Fig. 2.4 is really quite a strong statement about information processing . A more 
general view is to regard thought as depending upon isolable subsystems, or 
modules , of information processing actions that operate independently of each 
other (Fodor , 1983; Posner, 1978). Each of the modules contains its own view of 
some aspect of the external world. These views are eventually integrated into an 
overall representation of what is going on . As an example of modular processing , 
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STIMULU S PR EPR OCESS IN G 
STIMULU S CL RSS IFI CRTI ON 
RESPO NSE SELEC TIO N 
\V 
RESP ON SE EXEC UT IO N 
FIG. 2.4. Smith 's (1 968) stage 
model of stimulus class ification and 
response production. Each box is as-
sumed to represent a d istinct psycho-
logical process . The processes take 
place in series, progressing from the 
top downward . 
consider what must happen when an automobile driver is told , verbally, by a 
passenger, that the passenger would like to stop for dinner at the next restaurant. 
Figure 2.5 shows the exchange of information between modules that must go on 
inside the driver's head if the car is to be maneuvered into the nearest restaurant 
parking lot . 
The current " wisdom " is that the integration of modular process ing that 
occurs in cognition can be modeled by the use of a conceptual device known as a 
production execution system. The basis of production execution systems is the 
production , that is, a pattern and an action to be taken if that pattern is executed. 
In Fig. 2. 6 is a slightly whimsical set of productions for driving a car. Each 
module of thought can be conceptualized as the set of patterns and primitive 
actions that are effected within by that module. Intermodule communication is 
achieved by allowing modules to place their output either into the pattern area of 
other modules or (more usually) by assuming a common " blackboard" area that 
can contain patterns appropriate to any of the separate modules. This is illus-
trated in Fig. 2. 7 , which shows the organization of an hypothetical modular 
FIG . 2. 5 . A modular approach to 
cognition. Each box represents a 
class of menta l processing, analagous 
to a spec iali zed work shop. In inte-
grated thinking info rmation is passed 
back and forth between the di fferent 
modules, and fi nally represented as a 
coherent internal picture of the ex ter-
nal world . Process ing is not neces-
saril y serial. 
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FIG. 2.6. Fragments of a set of pro-
duction rules for driving an 
automobile. 
COND IT I ON 
1 F THE LlGHT l S 
1 F THE Ll GHT lS 
1F THE LlGHT l S 
RNO CRRS RRE 1N 
1NTESECT10N 
1F THE LlGHT lS 
RNO NO CRRS RRE 
1NTERSECT10N 
ACTION 
RED THEN BRRKE 
GREEN THEN CONT1NUE 
YELLOW 
THE THEN BRRKE 
YELLOW 
1N THE THEN RCCELERRTE 
system of productions that might be required to execute the logical production 
system stated in Fig . 2.6. 
Thinking of thinking as organized modularity leads to an emphasis upon 
certain classes of information processing functions. The first is the definition of 
the modules themselves. Modules should not be thought of as stages in compo-
nent processes (as described previously in discussing R. J. Sternberg's work) , 
but rather as specialized workshops containing resources to be assembled into 
component processes. The distinction is roughly analagous to the distinction 
between a hardware manufacturer, such as the Boeing Aircraft Company, that is 
capable of doing certain things , provided its shops are not overloaded, and the 
stages in the process of constructing a specific aircraft, missile, or space vehicle. 
lnformation processing research attempts to identify the modules and the 
actions of which the modules are capable. This is done by inferring the existence 
of a module , or of a process within a module, and by observing the selective 
action of variables on certain types of performance . An example is a widely cited 
study by Biederman and Kaplan ( 1970) which demonstrated selective effects of 
stimulus discriminability and response compatibility upon visual encoding and 
motor response production systems . An alternative technique for inferring the 
existence of separate modules is to show that action within one module does not 
interfere with action in another module. This sort of reasoning is exemplified by 
FIG. 2.7. The organization of an 
information processing system for 
executing productions. The produc-
tions res ide in long term memory . In-
format ion is presented to the system 
on auditory and visua l channels that 
are connected to the external world. 
The system can "keep notes for it- · 
se lf" by placing temporary informa-
tion in work ing memory, and using 
this information to guide production 
selecti on. 
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dual task studies, in which people are asked to do ostensibly independent tasks. 
If the tasks are done by separate modules it should be possible to time share the 
tasks without interference . A good illustration is a study by Kerr et al. (1985) in 
which main'taining one's posture was found to interfere with visual but not with 
verbal memory tasks . 
Once modules have been identified one can investigate the extent to which 
each module displays variation across individuals . Similar studies can be made 
of processes within a module. Logically, individuals are treated as factors in an 
experiment, and one observes when differences associated with individuals 
(e.g., age, sex, or sometimes simply individual identity) make a difference in the 
performance of a task that is already known to involve a particular module. The 
fact that the modules have been defined independently is what distinguishes the 
experimental psychology of individual differences from psychometric investiga-
tions. In psychometric theory a "good" measure is defined by the pattern of 
correlations involving it and other tests. In cognitive psychology the meaning of 
the testing procedure will already have been defined, with respect to a pal1icular 
theory of cognition, and will have been justified by the nomothetic experiments 
done to validate that theory. The pattern of indi vidual differences is something to 
discover, but the pattern does not validate the measure . 
The approach can be illustrated by a further consideration of linguistic infor-
mation processing. The modular character of linguistic processing has been 
established by psychometric, neuropsychological , and experimental psychologi-
cal criteria. In order to process language one has to know words . This is reflected 
in the well known fact that (at least in young adults) vocabulary size is an 
excellent indicator of one's general ability to deal with language. This is the 
reason that vocabulary tests are often used as "markers" for verbal ability. Tests 
of the speed of retrieval of the meaning of common words identify a reliable 
dimension of individual differences. Furthermore, this dimension of ability is 
distinct from the ability to manipulate strings of words, as tested in the sentence 
verification paradigm (Hunt, Davidson, & Lansman, 1981; Palmer et aI., 1985). 
These findings indicate that the language processing module contains two some-
what separate mechanisms, one for retrieving word information from long-term 
memory and one for manipulating information after it has been retrieved. The 
conclusion is buttressed by neuropsychological findings indicating that different 
brain structures are involved in retrieval of word meaning and sentence analysis 
(Kolb & Whishaw, 1980). Because sentence and word processing are not per-
fectly correlated they evidently make a distinct contribution to the psychometri-
cian's verbal comprehension trait. Note the implied causality. Sentence and word 
processing measures are not regarded as loading on an underlying trait of verbal 
comprehension ability, they are thought of as producing that ability. On the other 
hand , from the point of view of someone interested in prediction, a test that 
mixed sentence and word processing into a general test of the ability to com-
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prehend language might be far more useful than isolated tests of the separate 
processes . 
Verbal comprehension depends on the integration of word information into 
sentence structure, and sentence structure into discourse structure. Detailed mod-
els for both processes have been proposed (Kintsch & van Dijk , 1978; Schank, 
1975). Both assume that what a comprehender does is to construct a structure 
representing the meaning of the message being received. This is not a trivial task, 
since the meaning of words and sentences will often be determined largely by 
context. Substantial individual differences in the ability to define words in con-
text have been observed , indicating that variation in fitting semantic meaning to 
pragmatic context is a major source of variation in verbal comprehension (Hunt, 
1985) . 
Positive findings such as these fit well into hierarchial psychometric models 
because they suggest that broad dimensions, such as "verbal ability," can be 
broken down into more tightly defined traits. But what about negative findings? 
One of the processes that facilitates the integration of words into sentences is a 
nonselective "printing" process , in which topics that have already been identi-
fied increase a person's sensitivity to the recognition of related words (Foss, 
1982). The usual example is that people shown the word "Doctor" are quick to 
recognize the following word "Nurse." There is no doubt about the existence of 
this mechanism or about its role in the processing of normal discourse . However 
the priming mechanism appears to show little variation across individuals , and 
therefore measures of it are poor predictors of relative verbal comprehension 
ability (Hunt, 1985) . 
From a cognitive science view, findings showing that there is a linguistic 
information processing module, that it has subprocesses, and that the sub-
processes sometimes show individual variation represent a start towards an infor-
mation processing theory of verbal ability. Mapping the distribution of individual 
differences, per se, (i .e., constructing the appropriate Euclidean representation) 
is not a high priority next step. Studies that relate theoretically defined measures 
to specific individual characteristics are far more interesting. For instance, it 
appears that adult aging harms linguistic information processing at the level of 
sentence and text integration (Cohen, 1979; Light, Zelinski, & Moore, 1982). 
This is somewhat contrary to the psychometric observation that' ' verbal ability," 
as defined by certain psychometric tests, is relatively impervious to aging (Bot-
winick, 1977). How is this discrepancy to be resolved? Questions such as this are 
central to a scientific understanding of individual differences, but may be much 
less central to prediction of performance in wide-range situations. 
The discussion of verbal comprehension illustrates how cognitive psychol-
ogists think about individual differences within an area of information processing 
module. Cognitive psychology also stresses the process of integration of infor-
mation across different modules, or across different sources of input. The dis-
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tinction is important. Studies of the exchange of information between processes 
deal with the passage of information from one representation to another. Studies 
of the way in which people deal with multiple sources of information focus more 
upon people's ability to control the way in which attention highlights first one, 
and then another, aspect of the current situation . Both of these concerns present 
challenges for the psychometric approach, but for somewhat different reasons. 
Virtually everyone who has examined problem solv ing has stressed the impor-
tance of forming a good problem representation . Perhaps the clearest example is 
in high school geometry. Strictly speaking, geometric problem solving is an 
exercise in syntactical analysis; well formed strings of symbols are to be written 
into other well formed strings using a finite set of rules. Problem diagrams are 
not logically necessary, but they certainly help . It is quite easy to show that 
people differ in the representations that they use. Consider the sentence verifica-
tion task. Most people solve this problem by comparing the meaning of linguistic 
descriptions of the picture to the meaning of the sentence. These are people who 
will use the sentence to construct an image of the picture they expect to see and 
then compare it to the picture that they are actually shown (MacLeod , Hunt, & 
Mathews, 1978) . Regularities in representation use can also be shown across 
cultures. Children raised in a western European culture will attack an object 
memorization task similar to the game "concentration" by developing a verbal 
strategy of where the objects are . Desert dwelling Australian aboriginal chi ldren 
treat the same task as one of memorizing a visual image (Kearins, 1981). 
The fact that different people use different representations poses a major 
problem for any trait model of cognition . Changes of representation may change 
the type of information processing that is required to take a particular test. This 
challenges a basic assumption of all psychometric methods; that the same linear 
combination of abilities can be used to predict the test score of every examinee. 
More colloquially, if representations change then there will be "representation 
optional" tests that are verbal tests to some and visual-spatial tests to others. 
When representation optional tests are included in psychometric batteries they 
will give erratic results, because their loadings will depend on the freq uency of 
use of different representations in the population being tested. (Sentence verifica-
tion tests provide mixed results when used with college students, but seem to be 
purely verbal tests in populations of older people [Hunt & Davidson, 198 1] .) By 
a sort of Darwinian logic, representation optional tests drop out of intelligence 
testing, because they do not fit well into the Euclidean model of ability descrip-
tion. But, from a cognitive sc ience view, knowing the sort of representations a 
person likes to use is one of the most important pieces of information that you 
can have about problem solving ability. 
Colloquially , we sometimes say that a person failed to solve a problem be-
cause their attention wandered. The ability to control attention during problem 
solving appears to be an important source of individual difference. This ability is 
usually tested by giving people several tasks to do in a short time period, and 
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seeing how well they are able to cope with streams of information from different 
tasks. The tasks involved are almost always very simple ones, such as detecting 
whether or not a particular word has occurred in a string of words presented to 
the right or left ear (dichotic listening), or determining whether a signal has been 
presented at a particular location in the visual field. These simple tasks are 
studied because they are believed to be key components in a variety of very 
complex machinery operating tasks, such as flying an airplane. 
Early research suggested that there are no reliable individual differences in the 
ability to do several things at once, apart from the ability to do each of the tasks 
singly . This early work has been criticized, however, on methodological 
grounds , and a reanalysis of key studies indicates that the abi lity to share one's 
attention across several tasks ("time sharing ability") is a reliable dimension of 
individual differences (Ackerman, Schneider, & Wickens , 1984; Stankov , 
1983). Research identifying just what time sharing ab ility is , is in its infancy . 
However, we do have some indications of its nature. 
Time sharing must involve some capacity for controlling attention. People 
who are good either at focusing attention on one auditory channel (e.g., li stening 
to a speech against a background of conversation) or splitting attention across 
two auditory channels (listening to a conversation while talking on the telephone) 
are not necessarily the people who can focus or split attention across the visual 
field, but there is a substantial (.60) correlation between measures of control of 
attention within each modality. This suggests that there are both inter and intra 
modality mechanisms involved (Lansman, Poltrock , & Hunt, 1983). There also 
seems to be a reliable dimension of individual differences in the abi lity to shift 
attention from one stream of input to another. Examples are the task of shifting 
from listening to one ear in a dichotic presentation to listening in another, or 
shifting from following one sequence of visual symbols to following another 
(Hunt, 1986b; Hunt & Farr, 1984). We do not know the relation between "atten-
tion shifting" ability and the "attentional control" ability identified by Lansman 
et al. (1983). 
The abi lity to control attention is not tested by conventional psychometric 
procedures . There are two reasons why. One is that the motivation for studying 
individual differences in the control of attention is based partly on a desire to 
predict how well people will operate machinery in highly demanding, time 
limited situations. Again aircraft operation is the best example. The sorts of 
processes being tapped in attentional control studies are simply not an issue in the 
educational and business settings applications that fuel many psychological stud-
ies of intelligence. There is also an intentionally practical reason for avoid ing 
studying attention in a psychometric framework. 
The procedures required to evaluate the control of attention are, to put it 
mildly, not easily included in the usual psychometric testing situation. The tasks 
are complicated so the participants must receive a careful explanation of them. In 
some cases up to several hours of practice may be needed before a person's 
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performance is stable enough so that he or she can be tested . All of these 
considerations mitigate against the "large N" studies upon which psychometric 
technology depends. However, there is no way to shortcut the precautions. As 
was pointed out earlier, cognitive psychology develops procedures that are justi-
fied by their relevance to a theoretical model. Any use of these procedures must 
contain internal checks to make sure that the model still applies. In the case of 
studies of attention, the procedures and the internal checks will often be so 
onerous as to preclude their use in conventional personnel evaluation settings. 
This pragmatic fact does not diminish the theory , nor does it diminish our 
scientific interest in individual differences in attention. 
Previous remarks have focused on the conceptual limits of the psychometric 
approach. It is worth noting that in the case of studies of attention, cognitive 
psychology has also been myopic . "Attention" has been conceived of as some-
thing that a person throws from one place to another, in response to an environ-
ment that demands an instantaneous response. This is a realistic model for 
skateboarders, all the time , and for airplane pilots some of the time. in most 
human endeavors, though , the cognitive environment demands responses within 
minutes , hours, or even days . The person doing the thinking usually has a good 
deal of freedom in scheduling the order if different cognitive tasks are to be done. 
This is a very different situation to study within the technologies of both psycho-
metrics and cognitive psychology, because it means giving control of the situa-
tion over to the participant. And once this is done, the examinee has control over 
what is to be measured . Understandably both psychometricians and experimental 
psychologists avoid such situations. However difficult to measure, the ability to 
structure one's environment may be the key to successful thinking . This becomes 
apparent when we consider the topmost level of cognitive psychology, the study 
of conscious, specialized problem solving. 
Complex problem solving is very much influenced by the representations that 
problem solvers choose to use , so understanding the process by which represen-
tations are developed, selected, and chosen for use has become a central goal of 
cognitive psychology. Because the choice of optional representations is very 
heavily influenced by learning, any theory of representation in problem solving 
has to be , in effect, a theory of how a person acquires and uses knowledge. The 
effects of representation owning on representation having are multiplicative, not 
additive. 
This point has been illustrated in a striking way in studies that show how the 
information that a person extracts from a situation depends upon the person's 
representation of the situation itself. Chiesi, Spillich, and Voss (1979) offered a 
good illustrative study in a rather trivial field , recalling an account of a baseball 
game . People who were familiar with baseball could construct a representation of 
the plays being described. This caused them to focus on game relevant informa-
tion, which they were subsequently able to recall. People not familiar with 
baseball were not able to do this , although they were able to recall game irrele-
vant information contained in the broadcast. 
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At one level, such an observation is hardly surprising. "Everyone" knows 
that people recall more about events that they understand. But this is precisely 
the point. Understanding and learning are problem solving situations, in which a 
person ' s current knowledge is used to structure new knowledge. The topic of 
Chiesi et al. experiment may have been trivial. The principle was not. Exactly 
the same point can be made (after a much more complicated analysis) by study-
ing the way in which students acquire knowledge of plane geometry, or of 
computer programming (Anderson, Boyle, Farrell, & Reiser, 1984). And con-
sider a still more detailed analysis of a very important activity . Carbonell (1978) 
was able to simulate conservative and liberal interpretations of political events 
using a program that applied identical information processing mechanisms to 
merge the statements with different representations of political and social forces . 
What one gets from experience depends very heavily upon one's interpretation of 
it. 
The psychometric view is quite unsatisfactory here. Saying that people differ 
in their ability to use common, culturally defined solution methods (the defini-
tion of Gc) hardly captures the process of representation use. Amplifying the 
statement by saying that content knowledge extends Gc in specific fields is only a 
small step forward, for the psychometrician is still operating within the Eucli-
dean representation of cognition. Regarding 'applying knowledge' as a trait does 
not discriminate between the possession of knowledge and the ability to see that a 
particular piece of knowledge is relevant to the problem at hand. It is fairly easy 
to demonstrate ·that the two are not synonymous. People can be given exactly the 
appropriate knowledge to use in problem solving, but in a slightly different 
context, and be unable to apply it. Some people see connections where others do 
not (Gick & Holyoak, 1983) , but why? What processing differences are there 
between people who do and don't make generalizations? This is another example 
of a question that is central to a science of individual differences but not particu-
larly crucial to a technology for prediction. 
The issue being raised here is quite a broad one, for it has to do with the way 
in which "culturally acquired knowledge" is used. While some knowledge 
consists of ready-made answers to questions of fact, for example, much cultural 
knowledge consists of ways of representing problems so that their solution can be 
achieved . The representations form skeletons that guide thought, directing one's 
attention to key aspects of the problem at hand and suggesting particular solu-
tions. Different theorists have used the terms "schema," "frame, " and 
"script" to describe this process. These terms all reflect what seems to be a 
universal characteristic of human thought. The world is often ambiguous or 
overwhelmingly complicated. People bring order into this chaos by assuming 
that the world satisfies the constraints implicit in their world view. Successful 
problem solving is largely a process of trying out one or another constraining 
representation until one is found that works. To give a concrete example, consid-
er the problem solving process of expert physicists. They recognize specific 
problems as instantiations of a generalized class of problems (e.g., balance of 
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force problems). Once recognition has been achieved problem solving methods 
associated with the general class can then be applied to solve the specific prob-
lem. Novices are likely to focus on aspects of a problem that are not relevant to 
the general classification principles (e .g., is a sliding block involved?), leading 
to the use of general, but clumsy problem solving methods. (Chi, Glaser, & 
Reese, 1981; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon , 1980). 
The realization that most problem solving is achieved by context specific 
methods marks a major change in Cognitive Science. Early work on artificial 
intelligence and human problem solving placed great emphasis on the discovery 
of general problem solving methods (Hunt, 1975). More recent studies have 
emphasized area specific knowledge (Feigenbaum, 1977; Hayes-Roth, Water-
man, & Lenat, 1983). The same trend has been evident in cognitive psychology, 
where research has shown the extreme importance of topic specific schemata as 
guides in problem solving. 
If this trend was to be taken to its extreme, generalized psychometrics would 
be, if not impossible, at least greatly changed. The whole idea of "intelligence" 
is that there is some mental characteristic of the individual that applies to many 
problem solving situations. An emphasis on the use of schema in problem solv-
ing does not completely deny this notion , for some schema will have wide 
applfcability, especially in educational settings. Arguing again by illustration, 
Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) have shown that understanding of a text is driven 
by schema that specify the form of argument in different types of text (stories, 
scientific reports, etc .) . Obviously , it is possible to design tests to see whether or 
not people possess these general schema. Such tests are likely to be useful 
predictors of ability to function in places where general schema are used. Educa-
tional settings immediately spring to mind . Tests of general schema use are not 
likely to be of much use in predicting performance in situations in which effec-
tive local schema operate. People appear to be able to function quite well with a 
local schema even though they are not terribly comfortable with a related, more 
general problem solving procedure. 
Some recent studies of the learning and the use of mathematics and logic 
provide excellent examples of this point. Mathematics and logic are often 
thought of as the purest, most abstract , and most general problem solving meth-
ods. At least in academic circles , an argument can be justified solely by appeal-
ing to its logical purity. When children learn mathematical problems they learn 
them as schema (Riley, Heller: & Greeno, 1983). Much of the difficulty in 
mathematics appears to be in translating from a nonmathematical statement of a 
problem into the appropriate schema (Kintsch & Greeno, 1985). At a grander 
level , the abstract schema of mathematics are so hard to learn that the ability to 
do so is often considered in itself a hallmark of intelligence . 
If mathematical reasoning is so difficult, how does the modern world func-
tion? To take a specific example, how do people calculate the price of products in 
a supermarket? People are quite good at doing so, even though pricing informa-
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tion is not always presented in the most straightforward way (Lave, Murtagh, & 
De la Roche, 1984). The same people are not good at solving simple arithmetic 
problems, when those problems are presented outside of the shopping context. 
Lave et al. found that shoppers made errors on only 2% of the pricing problems 
presented in an actual shopping context and on 41 % of the problems presented in 
an abstract arithmetical context. This was true even though the same arithmetic 
operations were used in each case. Furthermore the two tests were not reliably 
correlated! Further probing showed that the shoppers had a variety of problem 
solving procedures that were specialized for shopping and that were quite ade-
quate for problem solving in that context. 
Shopping is not the only place where people exhibit context-specific spe-
cializations of a logic that, in some abstract sense, they really do not understand . 
Ceci and Liker (1985) have reported a study similar to Lave's using an even 
higher order skill, statistical decision making . Inveterate horse race bettors have 
to determine whether the odds offered by the track are actually a good estimate of 
whether or not a horse will win. (The racetrack odds are determined solely by the 
amount of money bet on each horse, and do not reflect an explicit analysis of the 
horse's ability vis a vis its competitors.) Some individuals can "beat the odds" 
reliably. It is possible to formulate what they do as a complicated statistical 
estimation problem. But the racetrack handicappers were far from being un-
tutored, brilliant mathematicians. In fact, their formal intelligence test scores 
were well below undergraduate norms . The skilled handicappers had developed 
complicated, race-track specific techniques for handling an unusually complex 
problem in decision making. 
None of these remarks will be new to those familiar with studies of cross 
cultural cognition. Specialists in this field have long pointed out that the Western 
emphasis on "intelligence" emphasizes the ability to do problem solving in the 
abstract. The very idea of abstract problem solving seems to be related to West-
ern European schooling (Cole & Scribner, 1974) . While this may be true , it does 
beg a very important point. The Western European schooling situation, with its 
emphasis on abstract problem solving, may indeed be a cultural phenomenon . 
However, it is an important, useful phenomenon. Skills in logic , mathematics, 
and general problem solving are an important part of our culture, even these 
skills are then specialized as people find their niche in society. Therefore identi-
fying people who are likely to become good general problem solvers is a reason-
able endeavor. 
This is where the concepts of Gc and, to a lesser extent, Gf, are likely to be 
useful. Let us accept the fact that high scores on Gc tests identify those people 
who have acquired the problem solving schemata of our society. Those are the 
very schemata that are going to be used in the classrooms , to aid people in 
acquiring further decontextualized knowledge . Perhaps we could design better 
tests is we had a better idea of how the educational process proceeds, because we 
would then know what schemata are going to be required, when, and (perhaps) 
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how they should be learned. Furthermore, at least in theory Western schooling is 
supposed to develop an ability to generalize; that is to see how problem solving 
schemata learned in one setting can be applied in another. It may be that tests of 
Gf identify people who can make such generalizations. If we had a better under-
standing of the process of schemata generalization we would know what it is that 
these people are doing, and then could develop better tests for their identifica-
tion. 
THE UNION OF THE CAMPS 
Cronbach (1957) sought a uniting of two camps of scientific psychology; the 
study of individual differences and the study of nomothetic influences on cogni-
tion . The prospects for uniting these camps is excellent. However, the study of 
individual differences is not identical to the use of a Euclidean representation of 
mental abilities. The prospects for uniting psychometrics and cognitive psychol-
ogy are mixed, and for perfectly good reasons. 
The paper and pencil testing technology and its accompanying Eucl idean 
representation are hard to beat, so long as one's criteria are cost effective evalua-
tion , and predicting is to a situation that involves very general behavior that 
depends on decontextualized reasoning processes . Education and , to a lesser 
extent , military life are examples of such situations. Traditional psychometric 
evaluation has not , and probably will not , be extended successfully to the predic-
tion of performance in more specific situations, where adequacy depends upon 
the ability of an individual to execute situation specific, schema based, and 
perhaps complex information processing sequences . Note that the problem here 
is not that the paper and pencil technology is inadequate to construct such 
situations. The problem is that the underlying Euclidean representation of mental 
abilities cannot be used to formulate a process model of cognition . 
Enter the computer. My frequent references to "paper and pencil tech-
nology" may have sounded archaic to those who are already programming 
computer presentations of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the Armed 
Services Vocational Battery, and any number of other intelligence tests . Doing 
so will certainly make testing more efficient , as witnessed by current develop-
ments in " item banking" and latent trait theory (Green et aI. , 1982). Further-
more, computer presentations are more fl ex ible than paper and pencil presenta-
tions, so the Euclidean model can be extended to new domains. Some possibili-
ties are extensions of spatial-visual testing to the situations involving moving 
visual displays (Hunt & Pellegrino , 1985) and the development of practical tests 
of auditory information process ing (Stankov & Horn, 1980). We may have to 
add a few dimensions to the Euclidean model, or we may not. Either way , the 
expansion of the traditional model via computerized testing will be a useful 
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exercise. In itself, though, computerized testing will not address the conceptual 
issues that have been raised here. There is every reason to believe that a theory of 
individual differences can be developed as a subtheory of a general theory of 
cognitive psychology and will result in a better understanding of how individual 
variables such as age, education, sex, and genetics influence the processes of 
problem solving. To what extent will or will not this theory influence the tech-
nology of testing? 
It is now technically possible to develop automated laboratories, so that the 
experimental psychologist can collect data on enough individuals to study indi-
vidual differences. In the abstract, one could conceive of the development of 
even larger laboratories devoted to assessment and prediction. Such laboratories 
would immediately encounter another economic limit; the expense of the evalua-
tion to the examinee. The sorts of measurements required by cognitive process 
theories are often extremely time consuming. The equipment is relatively com-
plex, so that the examinee must spend considerable time learning to use it before 
any data can be collected. This and several related problems are very well 
discussed in Longstreth's (1984) excellent critique of the misuse that has been 
made of choice reaction time paradigms in order to fit them into an evaluation 
setting. A point that was made earlier is more than worth repeating . The mea-
sures developed from cognitive process theories are valid only when the bound-
ary conditions for measurement are met. This requirement may forever prevent 
developing cognitive psychology analogs to the ten to twenty minute tests so 
common in psychometric batteries . 
These remarks apply with particular force to any testing program based on the 
information processing aspect of cognitive science. Because such tests are likely 
to be expensive, testing itself will of necessity be limited to those situations in 
which prediction is important and in which performance is limited by a person's 
information processing capacity, once that person has acquired the specific 
knowledge required to perform at all. This suggests two guidelines for applied 
research. If information processing models are to be useful, then the test con-
structor must have a good idea of how information processing limits performance 
in the situation to be predicted . Two cases can be imagined. In one the key 
information processing requirements are not situation specific, and hence may be 
tested using some manageable testing paradigm. In the other case the information 
processing limits may be definable only in context, and hence can be tested only 
in the actual situation or an adequate simulation of it. If this is so it may not be 
possible to test examinees who do not already have a good understanding of the 
job for which they are applying . In either case the test constructor cannot proceed 
without a situational model. One can imagine such a model for specific situa-
tions, such as aircrew or radar operation. A detailed model of the information 
processing required in high school is unlikely. 
At first glance a theory of the use of representations might seem to be of little 
use in personnel evaluation because, by definition, representations are used by 
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people who have already acquired experti se in some field of endeavor. Ergo they 
must have already been permitted entry to the field . Fortunately this logic can be 
reversed . If " becoming an expert" means acquiring certain problem solving 
schema, why not evaluate a student by determining the extent to which the 
expert 's problem solving schema have been internalized? Developments in Ar-
tificial Intelligence have led to at least the claim that we can represent expert 
knowledge inside a computer (Hayes-Roth et al. , 1983; but see Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus 1984 for questions about some of the evidence on which the claim is 
based). "All " that needs to be done is to apply the interview methods used to 
extract knowledge from an expert to extract (faulty) knowledge from a student. 
To aid teaching, the evaluation process can be made the basis for further spe-
cialized instruction . 
Efforts are underway to develop just thi s sort of intelligent computer aided 
instruction system (Anderson et al. , 1984 ). The teaching goals appear to , be 
in reach in nontrivial fields (computer programming and geometry). Whether or 
not the evaluation goal is feas ible remains to be determined . The present intel-
ligence tutoring programs seem to make a rather general guess at the student 's 
current state of knowledge , and use that guess to select problems that are most 
educational for that student. Whether or not the program's guess about the 
student's representation is sufficiently accurate to be predictive remain to be 
seen. 
CONCLUSION 
Cronbach thought that general theories of psychological process ought not to 
ignore individual differences, and vice versa. He was right , and in a general 
sense the union of the camps is well underway. In my opinion (and here there 
may be a violent di fference of opinion! ) the way to achieve the scientific union is 
to concentrate on understanding how individual differences variables, such as 
age, sex , genetic constitution, and education, influence the processes of cogni-
tion. It does not seem particularly fruitful to try to derive the dimensions of the 
psychometric Euclidean representation of abilities from an underlying process 
theory. 
This does not mean that the Euclidean model is wrong, within the context in 
which it has been developed . Consider an analogy to what we know about 
experti se. Experts develop local schema that apply to their local problems. The 
psychometric Euclidean model is an excellent way to deal with personnel predic-
tion and classification. But it does not generali ze well to understanding cognitive 
actions. Einstein was certainly intelligent , in the psychometric sense. However 
he did not develop a single one of hi s intellectual conceptuali zations because he 
was high on Gc or Gf. He developed them because he had certain schema for 
problem solving and because he had the information processing capac ity to apply 
these schema. 
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Eventually there may be a "Grand Unified Theory" of psychology, similar to 
those now being developed for physics. But will we understand it? There seems 
to be a role for Newtonian mechanics even after quantum theory. Engineers use 
the limited Newtonian notions all the time. Psychometric and cognitive process 
theories may similarly co-exist for many years. Practical application and power 
of conceptualization are both worthwhile goals. They are not necessarily 
synonymous. 
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